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U.S. Army Futures Command Research Program Realignment - Board On Army Research And Development - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

2022 Assessment of the DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory - Division On Engineering And Physical Sciences - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Assessment of the In-House Laboratory Independent Research at the Army's Research, Development, and Engineering Centers - Division On Engineering And

Reusable Booster System - Committee For The Reusable Booster System: Review And Assessment - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Reusable Booster System - Committee For The Reusable Booster System: Review And Assessment - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

On June 15, 2011, the Air Force Space Command established a new vision, mission, and set of goals to ensure continued U.S. dominance in space and cyberspace mission areas. Subsequently, and in coordination with the Air Force Research Laboratory, the Space and Missile Systems Center, and the 14th and 24th Air Forces, the Air Force Space Command identified four long-term science and technology (S&T) challenges critical to meeting these goals. One of these challenges is to provide full-spectrum launch capability at dramatically lower cost, and a reusable booster system (RBS) has been proposed as an approach to meet this challenge. The Air Force Space Command asked the Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Research Council to conduct an independent review and assessment of the RBS concept prior to considering a continuation of RBS-related activities within the Air Force Research Laboratory portfolio and before initiating a more extensive RBS development program. The committee for the Reusable Booster System: Review and Assessment was formed in response to that request and charged with reviewing and assessing the criteria and assumptions used in the current RBS plans, the cost model methodologies used to fame [frame?] the RBS business case, and the technical maturity and development plans of key elements critical to RBS implementation. The committee consisted of experts not connected with current RBS activities who have significant expertise in launch vehicle design and operation, research and technology development and implementation, space system operations, and cost analysis. The committee solicited and received input on the Air Force launch requirements, the baseline RBS concept, cost models and assessment, and technology readiness. The committee also received input from industry associated with RBS concept, industry independent of the RBS concept, and propulsion system providers which is summarized in Reusable Booster System: Review and Assessment. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 Background2 Air Force EELV-Class Launch Requirements and Approaches3 Reusable Booster System Technology Assessment4 Cost Assessment5 Program Implementation6 Findings and RecommendationsAppendixesAppendix A: Statement of TaskAppendix B: Committee Member and Staff BiographiesAppendix C: List of Presenters to the CommitteeAppendix D: Acronyms and AbbreviationsAppendix E: Selected Reusable Launch Vehicle Development HistoryAppendix F: RBS Booster Design for Operability

DKK 279.00
1

Strategies to Leverage Research Funding - Board On Health Sciences Policy - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense - Committee On An Assessment Of Concepts And Systems For U.s. Boost Phase Missile Defense In Comparison To

Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense - Committee On An Assessment Of Concepts And Systems For U.s. Boost Phase Missile Defense In Comparison To

The Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives set forth to provide an assessment of the feasibility, practicality, and affordability of U.S. boost-phase missile defense compared with that of the U.S. non-boost missile defense when countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces of the United States and its allies and defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. To provide a context for this analysis of present and proposed U.S. boost-phase and non-boost missile defense concepts and systems, the committee considered the following to be the missions for ballistic missile defense (BMD): protecting of the U.S. homeland against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or conventional ballistic missile attacks; protection of U.S. forces, including military bases, logistics, command and control facilities, and deployed forces, including military bases, logistics, and command and control facilities. They also considered deployed forces themselves in theaters of operation against ballistic missile attacks armed with WMD or conventional munitions, and protection of U.S. allies, partners, and host nations against ballistic-missile-delivered WMD and conventional weapons. Consistent with U.S. policy and the congressional tasking, the committee conducted its analysis on the basis that it is not a mission of U.S. BMD systems to defend against large-scale deliberate nuclear attacks by Russia or China. Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives suggests that great care should be taken by the U.S. in ensuring that negotiations on space agreements not adversely impact missile defense effectiveness. This report also explains in further detail the findings of the committee, makes recommendations, and sets guidelines for the future of ballistic missile defense research.

DKK 383.00
1

Advanced Battle Management System - Division On Engineering And Physical Sciences - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Advanced Battle Management System - Division On Engineering And Physical Sciences - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

The U.S. Department of Defense is pursuing an improved ability to more closely integrate and operate jointly against agile adversaries through Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). This framework will seamlessly integrate sensors, networks, platforms, commanders, operators, and weapon systems for rapid information collection, decision-making, and projection of joint and multinational forces. The Department of the Air Force's contribution to JADC2 is the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). As an evolving system in the early stages of definition, ABMS architecture and its supporting elements remain dynamic. Advanced Battle Management System assesses the technical approach being employed by ABMS and its ability to effectively support the range of system integration desired, while also supporting operational and development agility; and the governance being applied by ABMS and if it is appropriate and sufficient to enable quick development and evolution of capabilities while maintaining appropriate government control over the output. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 Perspectives2 Architecture and Data3 Governance4 Challenges and OpportunitiesSelected BibliographyAppendixesAppendix A: Statement of TaskAppendix B: Data-Gathering MeetingsAppendix C: Acronyms and AbbreviationsAppendix D: Committee Member Biographical InformationAppendix E: Disclosure of Unavoidable Conflicts of Interest

DKK 214.00
1

Toward a Universal Radio Frequency System for Special Operations Forces - Committee On Universal Radio Frequency System For Special Operations Forces

Toward a Universal Radio Frequency System for Special Operations Forces - Committee On Universal Radio Frequency System For Special Operations Forces

The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was formed in response to the failed rescue attempt in 1980 of American hostages held by Iran. Among its key responsibilities, SOCOM plans and synchronizes operations against terrorist networks. Special operations forces (SOF) often operate alone in austere environments with only the items they can carry, which makes equipment size, weight, and power needs especially important. Specialized radios and supporting equipment must be carried by the teams for their radio-frequency (RF) operations. As warfighting demands on SOCOM have intensified, SOCOM's needs for significantly improved radio-frequency (RF) systems have increased. Toward a Universal Radio Frequency System for Special Operations Forces examines the current state of the art for both handheld and manpackable platform-mounted RF systems, and determines which frequencies could be provided by handheld systems. The book also explores whether or not a system that fulfills SOF's unique requirements could be deployed in a reasonable time period. Several recommendations are included to address these and other issues. Table of ContentsFront MatterToward a Universal Radio Frequency System for Special Operations Forces: Abbreviated VersionAppendixesAppendix A: Biographical Sketches of Committee MembersAppendix B: Meetings and Participating OrganizationsAppendix C: Selected Findings and Recommendations from Previous National Research Council Reports Related to Power and Energy Sources

DKK 218.00
1

Sensing and Supporting Communications Capabilities for Special Operations Forces - Committee On Sensing And Communications Capabilities For Special

Sensing and Supporting Communications Capabilities for Special Operations Forces - Committee On Sensing And Communications Capabilities For Special

Among its key responsibilities, the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) plans and synchronizes operations against terrorist networks. At any given moment, SOF are likely to be engaged in some state of the planning or execution of special operations in many countries around the world, spanning a wide range of environments and mission. SOF therefore must be capable of operating in environments ranging from tropical jungle to arctic, maritime to desert, subterranean to mountainous, and rural to urban. Within this vast range additional factors may influence technical and operational requirements including weather, topography, bathymetry, geology, flora, fauna, and human population density. All of these factors must be weighed in terms of the challenges they pose to supporting communications and operational security. In short, SOF must maintain the capability to operate globally, in any environment, angainst any threats that can be countered by its unique capabilities. Sensing and Supporting Communications Capabilities for Special Operations Forces focuses primarily on the key core SOF task of special reconnaissance, to determine SOF-specific sensing and supporting communications needs and mapping them to existing and emerging technologies. The book discusses preliminary observations, issuees, and challenges, and identifies additional capabilities and technology areas that should be addressed. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummaryAppendix A: Biographical Sketches of Committee MembersAppendix B: Meetings and Participating OrganizationsAppendix C: Suggested Reading

DKK 169.00
1

Improved Operational Testing and Evaluation - Division Of Behavioral And Social Sciences And Education - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Improved Operational Testing and Evaluation - Division Of Behavioral And Social Sciences And Education - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) is responsible for the operational testing and evaluation of Army systems in development. ATEC requested that the National Research Council form the Panel on Operational Test Design and Evaluation of the Interim Armored Vehicle (Stryker) to explore three issues concerning the initial operation test plans for the Stryker/Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT). First, the panel was asked to examine the measures selected to assess the performance and effectiveness of the Stryker/IBCT in comparison both to requirements and to the baseline system. Second, the panel was asked to review the test design for the Stryker/IBCT initial operational test to see whether it is consistent with best practices. Third, the panel was asked to identify the advantages and disadvantages of techniques for combining operational test data with data from other sources and types of use. In this report the panel presents findings, conclusions, and recommendations pertaining to the first two issues: measures of performance and effectiveness, and test design. The panel intends to prepare a second report that discusses techniques for combining information. Table of ContentsFront MatterExecutive Summary1. Introduction2. Test Process3. Test Measures4. Statistical Design5. Data Analysis6. Assessing the IBCT/Stryker Operational Test in a Broad ContextReferencesAppendix A: Letter Report of the Panel to the Army Test and Evalution CommandAppendix B: Force Exchange Ratio, Historical Win Probability, and Winning with Decisive ForceAppendix C: Biographical Sketches of Panel Members and Staff

DKK 286.00
1

An Assessment of Potential Health Effects from Exposure to PAVE PAWS Low-Level Phased-Array Radiofrequency Energy - Board On Radiation Effects

An Assessment of Potential Health Effects from Exposure to PAVE PAWS Low-Level Phased-Array Radiofrequency Energy - Board On Radiation Effects

PAVE PAWS is a phased-array warning system designed to detect and track sea-launched and intercontinental ballistic missiles operated on Cape Cod since 1979 by the U.S. Air Force Space Command. In 1979, the National Research Council issued two reports to address concerns from Cape Cod residents about the safety and possible health effects of the radiofrequency energy from the radar. Following up on the1979 report, the new report finds no evidence of adverse health effects to Cape Cod residents from long-term exposure to the PAVE PAWS radar. The report specifically investigated whether the PAVE PAWS radar might be responsible in part for the reported higher rates of certain cancers in the area, but concludes there is no increase in the total number of cancers or in specific cancers of the prostate, breast, lung, or colon due to radiation exposure from PAVE PAWS. The report did find in the scientific literature a few biological responses to radiofrequency exposures that were statistically significant. Such responses do not necessarily result in adverse health effects, but the report recommends additional studies to better discern the significance, if any, of those findings. Table of ContentsFront MatterPublic SummaryExecutive Summary1 Introduction2 Assessment of Classified Research Relevant to PAVE PAWS3 Physical Mechanisms for RF Effects on Biological Systems4 Exposure Levels5 PAVE PAWS Exposure Conditions6 Evidence of Biological Effects of RF Exposure Relevant to PAVE PAWS Radar System7 Animal and Human Studies Addressing Health Effects8 Epidemiological Studies of the Possible Adverse Health Effects of Pulsed Radar Emissions9 Health Considerations in the Cape Cod population10 Summary of Conclusions and RecommendationsAppendix A: Interim Letter ReportAppendix B: Acronyms and AbbreviationsCommittee Biosketches

DKK 396.00
1

Improved Operational Testing and Evaluation and Methods of Combining Test Information for the Stryker Family of Vehicles and Related Army Systems -

Improved Operational Testing and Evaluation and Methods of Combining Test Information for the Stryker Family of Vehicles and Related Army Systems -

The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) is responsible for the operational testing and evaluation of Army systems in development. ATECrequested that the National Research Council form the Panel on Operational Test Design and Evaluation of the Interim Armored Vehicle (Stryker). The charge to this panel was to explore three issues concerning the IOT plans for the Stryker/SBCT. First, the panel was asked to examine the measures selected to assess the performance and effectiveness of the Stryker/SBCT in comparison both to requirements and to the baseline system. Second, the panel was asked to review the test design for the Stryker/SBCT initial operational test to see whether it is consistent with best practices. Third, the panel was asked to identify the advantages and disadvantages of techniques for combining operational test data with data from other sources and types of use. In a previous report (appended to the current report) the panel presented findings, conclusions, and recommendations pertaining to the first two issues: measures of performance and effectiveness, and test design. In the current report, the panel discusses techniques for combining information. Table of ContentsFront MatterExecutive Summary1. Introduction to Combining Information2. Examples of Combining Information3. Combining Information in Practice4. Prerequisites for Combining Information5. Testing Challenges and Opportunities Posed by the Future Combat SystemReferencesAppendix A: Further Details Concerning the Bearing Cage ExampleAppendix B: Technical Details on Combining Information in Estimation: A Treatment of Separate Failure ModesAppendix C: The Rocket Development ProgramAppendix D: Acronyms and AbbreviationsPhase I Report: Operational Test Design and Evaluation of the Interim Armored VehicleBiographical Sketches of Panel Members and Staff

DKK 409.00
1

Adapting to Shorter Time Cycles in the United States Air Force - Air Force Studies Board - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Adapting to Shorter Time Cycles in the United States Air Force - Air Force Studies Board - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

The Air Force Studies Board of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine hosted a three-part workshop series to investigate the changing paradigm of time and knowledge in modern-day warfare. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense, three 2-day workshops were held virtually on September 16-17, 2020, September 23-24, 2020, and October 1-2, 2020. The objective of the first workshop was to explore the ways in which the U.S. Air Force (USAF) has adjusted its capabilities in response to past shifts in operational timing. In consideration of these past shifts, the second workshop aimed to consider when there could be an advantage to synchronize or desynchronize rates of change with adversaries. Participants had the opportunity to discuss lessons learned and possible changes for USAF Doctrine and future operations. The goal of the third workshop was to examine the implications to doctrine, concepts of operations, and command and control from the recent acceleration of battlespace operations, arising from wide-scale digitization, large-scale sensing, and faster technologies. In all three workshops, speakers explored the broader issues surrounding changing environments, and participants discussed ways to adapt to fundamental changes in the time constants of conflict. This proceedings is a factual summary of what occurred during the workshop series. Table of ContentsFront MatterIntroduction1 Workshop One, Part One2 Workshop One, Part Two3 Workshop Two, Part One4 Workshop Two, Part Two5 Workshop Three, Part One6 Workshop Three, Part TwoAppendixesAppendix A: Statement of TaskAppendix B: Workshop AgendasAppendix C: Biographical Information for Planning Committee MembersAppendix D: Uncertainty, Stability, Instability, Military Affairs, and Time: Some Thoughts and ConjecturesAppendix E: Thoughts and Reactions to Planning Committee DiscussionsAppendix F: E-Mail Commentary on Workshops One and TwoAppendix G: Workshop Series Recap Meeting

DKK 396.00
1

Continuing Kepler's Quest - Aeronautics And Space Engineering Board - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Continuing Kepler's Quest - Aeronautics And Space Engineering Board - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

In February 2009, the commercial communications satellite Iridium 33 collided with the Russian military communications satellite Cosmos 2251. The collision, which was not the first recorded between two satellites in orbit—but the most recent and alarming—produced thousands of pieces of debris, only a small percentage of which could be tracked by sensors located around the world. In early 2007, China tested a kinetic anti-satellite weapon against one of its own satellites, which also generated substantial amounts of space debris. These collisions highlighted the importance of maintaining accurate knowledge, and the associated uncertainty, of the orbit of each object in space. These data are needed to predict close approaches of space objects and to compute the probability of collision so that owners/operators can decide whether or not to make a collision avoidance maneuver by a spacecraft with such capability. The space object catalog currently contains more than 20,000 objects, and when the planned space fence radar becomes operational this number is expected to exceed 100,000. A key task is to determine if objects might come closer to each other, an event known as "conjunction," and the probability that they might collide. The U.S. Air Force is the primary U.S. government organization tasked with maintaining the space object catalog and data on all space objects. This is a complicated task, involving collecting data from a multitude of different sensors-many of which were not specifically designed to track orbiting objects-and fusing the tracking data along with other data, such as data from atmospheric models, to provide predictions of where objects will be in the future. The Committee for the Assessment of the U.S. Air Force's Astrodynamic Standards collected data and heard from numerous people involved in developing and maintaining the current astrodynamics standards for the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC), as well as representatives of the user community, such as NASA and commercial satellite owners and operators. Preventing collisions of space objects, regardless of their ownership, is in the national security interested of the United States. Continuing Kepler's Quest makes recommendations to the AFSPC in order for it to create and expand research programs, design and develop hardware and software, as well as determine which organizations to work with to achieve its goals. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 Meeting the Mission2 Astrodynamics Algorithms3 Systems Issues4 Broader IssuesAppendix A: Committee and Staff Biographical InformationAppendix B: Acronyms and Glossary

DKK 266.00
1