7 resultater (0,21490 sekunder)

Mærke

Butik

Pris (EUR)

Nulstil filter

Produkter
Fra
Butikker

Review of Closure Plans for the Baseline Incineration Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities - National Research Council - Bog - National Academies Press

Review of Closure Plans for the Baseline Incineration Chemical Agent Disposal Facilities - National Research Council - Bog - National Academies Press

This book responds to a request by the director of the U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA) for the National Research Council to examine and evaluate the ongoing planning for closure of the four currently operational baseline incineration chemical agent disposal facilities and the closure of a related testing facility. The book evaluates the closure planning process as well as some aspects of closure operations that are taking place while the facilities are still disposing of agent. These facilities are located in Anniston, Alabama; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Tooele, Utah; and Umatilla, Oregon. They are designated by the acronyms ANCDF, PBCDF, TOCDF, and UMCDF, respectively. Although the facilities all use the same technology and are in many ways identical, each has a particular set of challenges. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 Introduction2 Overall Closure Planning for Baseline Facilities3 Important Parameters for Successful Closure4 Management Systems: Lessons Learned Process and the eRoom Tool5 Regulatory Requirements Affecting Closure6 Monitoring and Analytical IssuesAppendixesAppendix A: Reprinted 2010 Letter ReportAppendix B: Safety and Environmental Metrics Employed by Private Companies Surveyed for This ReportAppendix C: Discussion of Hydrolysis Reactions of GB, VX, and HAppendix D: Committee MeetingsAppendix E: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

DKK 266.00
1

Measuring Progress in Obesity Prevention - Committee On Accelerating Progress In Obesity Prevention - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

Effects of the Deletion of Chemical Agent Washout on Operations at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant - Board On Army Science And

Effects of the Deletion of Chemical Agent Washout on Operations at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant - Board On Army Science And

The United States manufactured significant quantities of chemical weapons during the Cold War and the years prior. Because the chemical weapons are aging, storage constitutes an ongoing risk to the facility workforces and to the communities nearby. In addition, the Chemical Weapons Convention treaty stipulates that the chemical weapons be destroyed. The United States has destroyed approximately 90 percent of the chemical weapons stockpile located at seven sites. As part of the effort to destroy its remaining stockpile, the Department of Defense is building the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) on the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD), near Richmond, Kentucky. The stockpile stored at BGAD consists of rockets and projectiles containing the nerve agents GB and VX and the blister agent mustard. Continued storage poses a risk to the BGAD workforce and the surrounding community because these munitions are several decades old and are developing leaks. Due to public opposition to the use of incineration to destroy the BGAD stockpile, Congress mandated that non- incineration technologies be identified for use at BGCAPP. As a result, the original BGCAPP design called for munitions to be drained of agent and then for the munition bodies to be washed out using high-pressure hot water. However as part of a larger package of modifications called Engineering Change Proposal 87 (ECP-87), the munition washout step was eliminated. Effects of the Deletion of Chemical Agent Washout on Operations at the Blue Grass Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant examines the impacts of this design change on operations at BGCAPP and makes recommendations to guide future decision making. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 Introduction2 Plant Process Changes as a Result of Washout Deletion3 Impacts on Calculation of Destruction Efficiency4 Process Modeling in Support of Washout DeletionAppendixesAppendix A: Committee ActivitiesAppendix B; Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

DKK 266.00
1

Review of Acute Human-Toxicity Estimates for Selected Chemical-Warfare Agents - National Research Council - Bog - National Academies Press -

Review of Acute Human-Toxicity Estimates for Selected Chemical-Warfare Agents - National Research Council - Bog - National Academies Press -

No reliable acute-exposure1 standards have been established for the particular purpose of protecting soldiers from toxic exposures to chemical warfare (CW) agents. Some human-toxicity estimates are available for the most common CW agents—organophosphorus nerve agents and vesicants; however, most of those estimates were developed for offensive purposes (that is, to kill or incapacitate the enemy) and were intended to be interim values only. Because of the possibility of a chemical attack by a foreign power, the Army's Office of the Surgeon General asked the Army's Chemical Defense Equipment Process Action Team (CDEPAT) to review the toxicity data for the nerve agents GA (tabun), GB(sarin), GD (soman), GF, and VX, and the vesicant agent sulfur mustard (HD) and to establish a set of exposure limits that would be useful in protecting soldiers from toxic exposures to those agents. This report is an independent review of the CDEPAT report to determine the scientific validity of the proposed estimates. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 - Introduction and Background Lethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Threshold EffectsLethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Mild EffectsED50 for Severe EffectsCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSLethal Effects (LCt50)Lethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Severe EffectsLethal Effects (LD50)CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSLethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Threshold EffectsECt50 for Severe EffectsLethal Effects (LD50)ED50 for Severe EffectsCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSLethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Threshold EffectsECt50 for Severe EffectsLethal Effects (LD50)CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSLethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Severe EffectsECt50 for Threshold EffectsLethal Effects (LCt50)Ect50 for Mild EffectsED50 for Severe EffectsCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSLethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Severe EffectsLethal Effects (LCt50)ECt50 for Mild EffectsED50 for Severe EffectsCONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSUSE OF LOG-PROBIT ANALYSISUSE OF THE ECT50USE OF CONFIDENCE LIMITSReferencesGlossaryAppendix Offensive Versus Defensive Use of Human-Toxicity Estimates for CW Agents REFERENCE

DKK 318.00
1

Disposal Options for the Rocket Motors From Nerve Agent Rockets Stored at Blue Grass Army Depot - Board On Army Science And Technology - Bog -

Disposal Options for the Rocket Motors From Nerve Agent Rockets Stored at Blue Grass Army Depot - Board On Army Science And Technology - Bog -

The Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant (BGCAPP) is under construction near Richmond, Kentucky, two dispose of one of the two remaining stockpiles of chemical munitions in the United States. The stockpile that BGCAPP will dispose of is stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot (BGAD). BGCAPP is a tenant activity on BGAD. The stockpile stored at BGAD consists of mustard agent loaded in projectiles, and the nerve agents GB and VX loaded into projectiles and M55 rockets. BGCAPP will process the rockets by cutting them, still in their shipping and firing tube (SFT), between the warhead and motor sections of the rocket. The warhead will be processed through BGCAPP. The separated rocket motors that have been monitored for chemical agent and cleared for transportation outside of BGCAPP, the subject of this report, will be disposed of outside of BGCAPP. Any motors found to be contaminated with chemical agent will be processed through BGCAPP and are not addressed in this report. Disposal Options for the Rocket Motors From Nerve Agent Rockets Stored at Blue Grass Army Depot addresses safety in handling the separated rocket motors with special attention to the electrical ignition system, the need for adequate storage space for the motors in order to maintain the planned disposal rate at BGCAPP, thermal and chemical disposal technologies, and on-site and off-site disposal options. On-site is defined as disposal on BGAD, and off-site is defined as disposal by a commercial or government facility outside of BGAD. Table of ContentsFront MatterSummary1 Introduction2 Safety3 Technologies for Rocket Motor Disposal4 Storage of Separated Rocket Motors5 Options for Disposal of Separated Rocket MotorsAppendixesAppendix A: GlossaryAppendix B: Historical Overview of Public Sentiment Surrounding the Blue Grass Army Depot and the Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant Relevant to the Disposal of Separated Rocket MotorsAppendix C: Committee ActivitiesAppendix D: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members

DKK 266.00
1

2023 Nobel Prize Summit: Truth, Trust, and Hope - Global Sustainability And Development - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

2023 Nobel Prize Summit: Truth, Trust, and Hope - Global Sustainability And Development - Bog - National Academies Press - Plusbog.dk

On May 24-26, 2023, the Nobel Prize Summit entitled Truth, Trust, and Hope was convened as a hybrid event to examine misinformation and disinformation in the context of the broader information ecosystem, looking at the global impact of information technologies in nature and society. The summit brought together Nobel laureates, leading scientists, business leaders, writers, artists, and young innovators to share insights, challenges, and solutions relating to trust and information. With a positive narrative and the accelerating prevalence of artificial intelligence, big data, and other emerging information technologies, the summit explored the challenges and opportunities of democratization of knowledge and information and the erosion of trust. Held in Washington, DC and virtually, the 3-day summit attracted more than 700 in-person attendees and more than 10,000 online participants from more than 70 countries. Eleven Nobel laureates were actively engaged in the summit, and 32 partner organizations were involved, including breakout sessions and solution sessions. This publication summarizes the presentations, activities, and discussion of the summit. Table of ContentsFront Matter1 INTRODUCTION2 UNDERSTANDING HISTORY3 MAKING SENSE OF MISINFORMATION4 SEEKING TRUTH5 EXTENDING THE CONVERSATION: THE FORUM OF EXPERTS6 SOLUTION SESSIONS: TURNING DISCUSSIONS INTO ACTIONS7 APPENDIXESAPPENDIX A: THE GLOBAL CONVERSATION AGENDAAPPENDIX B: FORUM OF EXPERTS AGENDAAPPENDIX C: SOLUTION SESSIONS AGENDASREFERENCES

DKK 201.00
1

Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories - Board On Life Sciences - Bog - National Academies Press -

Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories - Board On Life Sciences - Bog - National Academies Press -

During July 10-13, 2011, 68 participants from 32 countries gathered in Istanbul, Turkey for a workshop organized by the United States National Research Council on Anticipating Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-containment Biological Laboratories. The United States Department of State's Biosecurity Engagement Program sponsored the workshop, which was held in partnership with the Turkish Academy of Sciences. The international workshop examined biosafety and biosecurity issues related to the design, construction, maintenance, and operation of high-containment biological laboratories- equivalent to United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention biological safety level 3 or 4 labs. Although these laboratories are needed to characterize highly dangerous human and animal pathogens, assist in disease surveillance, and produce vaccines, they are complex systems with inherent risks. Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories summarizes the workshop discussion, which included the following topics:Technological options to meet diagnostic, research, and other goals;Laboratory construction and commissioning;Operational maintenance to provide sustainable capabilities, safety, and security; andMeasures for encouraging a culture of responsible conduct. Workshop attendees described the history and current challenges they face in their individual laboratories. Speakers recounted steps they were taking to improve safety and security, from running training programs to implementing a variety of personnel reliability measures. Many also spoke about physical security, access controls, and monitoring pathogen inventories. Workshop participants also identified tensions in the field and suggested possible areas for action. Table of ContentsFront MatterOverview1 Introduction2 Framing the Issue (Plenary Sessions)3 Assessments of Needs, Challenges, and Resources (Plenary Session)4 Available Resources, Regulations, and Guidelines (Plenary Session)5 Paths from Assessments to Functional Labs (Breakout Sessions)6 Public Health Needs: Costs, Effectiveness, and Biosafety Requirements for Diagnostic Procedures (Breakout Sessions)7 Identifying Areas for Action (Breakout Sessions)8 Requirements for and Challenges Associated with BSL-4 Labs (Plenary Session)9 Concluding Plenary Discussion: Major Themes and Next StepsAbbreviations and AcronymsReferencesAppendix A: Workshop AgendaAppendix B: Committee, Participant, and Staff ListAppendix C: Committee, Participant, and Staff BiographiesAppendix D: Description of Tour of Pendik Veterinary Control and Research InstituteAppendix E: Country and Region OverviewsE1: BrazilE2: European UnionE3: PakistanE4: RussiaE5: SwedenE6: TurkeyE7: UkraineE8: United KingdomE9: United States

DKK 299.00
1